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FOREWORD
The United States increasingly relies on unmanned
aerial vehicles—better known as drones—to target insurgent and terrorist groups around the world. Drones
have a number of advantages that could fundamentally alter how the United States engages in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Drones
place no U.S. military personnel at risk. They do not
require a large “footprint” of U.S. personnel overseas.
They are armed with accurate missiles that have the capacity to target individuals, automobiles, and sections
of structures such as rooms in a large house. Perhaps
the most consequential advantage of drones is their
ability to integrate intelligence collection with decisions to use force. These characteristics should make
drones especially effective at targeting only the individuals against whom the United States wishes to use
force, and minimizing harm to noncombatants. This
highly selective use of force has the potential to allow
the United States to achieve its counterinsurgency objectives at lower cost and risk.
Critics, though, suggest that drone strikes have
been ineffective or have actually backfired. Drone
strikes are ineffective if some insurgent organizations
are large and resilient enough to survive the deaths
of their leaders and rank-and-file members. Many
observers suggest that any degradation of insurgent
organizations caused by drone strikes is outweighed
by the ability of such organizations to exploit even
small numbers of civilian casualties with the goals of
persuading people to join or support the insurgency.
A less common criticism of the drone strike campaign
focuses on how such strikes influence relationships
among insurgent organizations. While drone opera-
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tors may be able to distinguish civilians from militants,
it is more difficult to determine if a militant or group
of militants are core members of one insurgent organization or another. This presents a real problem where
multiple insurgent organizations are operating, and
the United States does not wish to target all of them.
This may actually promote cooperation among these
groups and lead them to focus more of their energies
on using violence in ways that undermine U.S. goals.
A number of researchers have investigated the relationships between the occurrence of drone strikes and
various types of behavior by insurgent and terrorist
groups with links to Pakistan. One reasonably consistent finding across the studies is that drone strikes have
little influence, positive or negative, on the amount of
insurgent violence that occurs in Afghanistan. A more
tentative conclusion that can be drawn from existing
research is that drone strikes that result in civilian
deaths appear to have little relationship with subsequent insurgent violence. This suggests that insurgent
organizations have not been very effective at leveraging such deaths in their propaganda to secure more
support. Another conclusion is that drone strikes that
kill militants in Pakistan are associated with increases
in subsequent insurgent violence in the country. This
fact could be creating a dynamic in which all insurgent
organizations, even those that have few grievances
against United States and the government of Pakistan
or that engage in low levels of violence, feel threatened
by the drones and seek support from other insurgent
organizations that do have as their goal undermining
the U.S. position in the region.
These findings have implications for the conduct
of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Drones appear to be, at most, weak substitutes
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for traditional counterinsurgency operations. While
drones have the capability to punish and deter insurgent organizations, they do not contribute alone to the
establishment of effective state authority in direct and
meaningful ways, which likely requires large numbers of ground forces and civilians to provide services
to and gain intelligence from the local population.
Drone strikes might achieve their objectives in a more
narrowly circumscribed counterterrorism, rather than
counterinsurgency, campaign. This claim is difficult
to assess, however, since the United States has not
consistently employed drones in a counterterrorism
campaign. One reason for this is that the targets of
drone strikes have been expanded and focus on areas
where the United States cannot or will not engage “on
the ground” in large numbers. Drones are most useful in precisely such areas, since they allow the United
States to project force when it and the national government have few other options. But the absence of
boots on the ground makes it more difficult to gather
human intelligence on the activities of militant groups
that can be used to target drone strikes. Drones, then,
are most useful for counterterrorism in precisely those
settings where the challenges of counterterrorism are
the greatest, and the ability to collect intelligence is
the weakest.
			
			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
The United States increasingly relies on unmanned
aerial vehicles—better known as drones—to target insurgent and terrorist groups around the world. Proponents argue that drones are, in both political and
military terms, an effective way to coerce such adversaries. Critics suggest that drone strikes not infrequently result in inadvertent civilian casualties, which
terrorist and insurgent organizations use as rallying
cries to garner support and legitimacy for their acts
of violence.
There is surprisingly little systematic evidence
that either of these positions is correct. It is not clear if
drone strikes have degraded their targets, or that they
kill enough civilians to create sizable public backlashes against the United States. Drones are a politically
and militarily attractive way to counter insurgents
and terrorists, but, paradoxically, this may lead to
their use in situations where they are less likely to be
effective and where there is difficulty in predicting
the consequences.
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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRONE STRIKES
IN COUNTERINSURGENCY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM CAMPAIGNS
INTRODUCTION
The United States increasingly relies on unmanned
aerial vehicles—better known as drones—to target insurgent and terrorist groups around the world. Drones
have been used in armed conflicts in which the United
States is a recognized participant, including the conflicts against insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and against government forces in Libya. The United
States has also used drones to strike at terrorist and
insurgent groups outside of theaters of armed conflict.
These include drone strikes that target militants in
Pakistan who support al-Qaeda and insurgents operating in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
in Yemen, and the al-Shabaab movement in Somalia.
The objectives of these campaigns of drone strikes
are to punish and to deter insurgent and terrorist organizations. They punish these organizations by killing and creating fear and uncertainty among current
members. They also seek to deter insurgents and terrorists from engaging in more violence, as well as to
deter others from joining or supporting these movements. While drones have attracted considerable attention, we know little about how effective they are
as tools of punishment and deterrence. In particular,
it is not clear how, if at all, drones differ from other
technologies of violence, what experience with broadly similar technologies in past conflicts suggests will
be the likely consequences of drone strikes, and what
systematic analysis of the available evidence suggests
about the effects of the drone campaigns.
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This monograph seeks to address these open questions. The next section describes the major elements of
drone technology that are relevant for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, and the logic
by which they are intended to punish and deter insurgent and terrorist organizations. The technological
capabilities of drones are an important advance over
similar forms of violence because they remove American military personnel from the immediate battlefield,
and allow the collection of real-time intelligence and its
tight integration with decisions to launch attacks. The
subsequent section explores what social science theory and experience with past counterinsurgency campaigns suggest would be the possible impacts of drone
strikes on insurgent organizations. Drone strikes are a
form of selective violence in which the attacker takes
considerable care to distinguish combatant targets
from noncombatants. Theory suggests that the more
selective the application of violence is, the more effective it will be in punishing and deterring insurgent and
terrorist organizations.
However, there is not universal agreement on this
point. Some conclude that even selective violence may
fuel insurgency and terrorism by creating anger and
grievances among those who identify with the targets of drone strikes. Another perspective holds that
distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants is insufficient to ensure that drone strikes deter
insurgency and terrorism. To have this effect, drone
strikes must also be able to distinguish between members of insurgent organizations that are hostile to the
United States and its allies and those that are not.
Failure to do so may push disparate insurgent organizations with distinct agendas to coalesce around the
goal of responding to drone strikes with even more
terrorist attacks.
2

A major barrier to assessing the effectiveness of
drone strikes has been the lack of adequate data and
appropriate techniques for analysis. Collecting such
data is quite difficult, because drone strikes occur in remote areas, some drone campaigns are officially covert
operations and thus are not officially discussed or assessed by the U.S. Government, and parties to the conflict may have incentives to manipulate perceptions of
the numbers of civilians and militants who are killed
by drone strikes. Nonetheless, a number of nongovernmental, journalist, and research groups have sought
to collect reliable data about the occurrence of drone
strikes, the location of such strikes, and the number
and identity of combatants and noncombatants who
are killed and injured. Since the longest running and
most extensive drone campaign has occurred in Pakistan, most of the systematic data collection effort has
focused on this country.
The third major section of this monograph summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies used to collect data on drone strikes. It then discusses how uncertainty about the occurrence, targets,
and victims of drone strikes can be exploited by militant groups to their advantage. It then uses some of
these data to describe in a series of figures possible relationships between drone strikes, militants killed and
civilian deaths, and subsequent terrorist and insurgent
violence in the region. The section also analyzes a number of ongoing efforts to understand these relationships by rigorously using different types of data and
more sophisticated and complex statistical techniques.
Although the data on drone strikes are imperfect, and
different research efforts use different techniques and
reach different conclusions, there are a few consistent
findings with important implications for policy and
strategy. One is that drone strikes against insurgent
3

camps and bases in Pakistan appear to have little relationship to terrorist attacks in Afghanistan. This null
finding is surprising, because one of the goals of the
drone strikes is to deter insurgent organizations that
operate in the country.
There is conflicting evidence on the effect of drone
strikes on terrorism in Pakistan. At least one ongoing
project finds that drones reduce the number and severity of terrorist attacks in the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA). Other research efforts, however, find that drone strikes are associated
with more, not less, terrorism in the entire country. Another preliminary finding is that civilian deaths from
drone strikes have no consistent relationship with terrorism in Pakistan. Although this research is still in the
preliminary stages, this finding suggests that concerns
that civilian deaths lead to immediate increases in support for terrorist and insurgent organizations do not
have a great deal of empirical support.
While rigorous research on drone strikes is just beginning, these findings have important implications
for the role of drones in counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations. The concluding section highlights two such implications. First, drones are rather
poor substitutes for traditional counterinsurgency operations. The reason is that drone strikes (as well as
other forms of force) may punish and deter a militant
movement, but they cannot directly contribute to the
protection of civilians and the strengthening of the authority and legitimacy of the government, which are
key objectives of the counterinsurgency doctrine of
the U.S. Army. Second, drone strikes conducted by the
United States may create perverse incentives for host
governments. These governments may exaggerate the
threat that they face from militant groups in order to
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secure American assistance, and they may provide incomplete intelligence in order to guide drone strikes
against their enemies rather than against groups that
target the United States. This risks involving the United States in long-running but ineffective campaigns of
drone strikes on behalf of local clients. The concluding section also highlights a number of questions that
could be fruitfully addressed in future work. These include how other countries, as well as insurgent organizations, may utilize drone technology in the future and
why American decisionmakers choose to use drones
rather than other types of armed force, as well as how
the American public views drones used against terrorist and insurgent organizations.
WHY DRONES ARE DIFFERENT
Drones—or, more formally, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs)—are
pilotless aircraft controlled by individuals located on
the ground, often some distance from the area where
the drone is operating. Drones come in many shapes
and sizes and perform a variety of missions, including
reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and combat.
The focus here is on combat drones, such as the MQ-1
Predator and MQ-9 Reaper UAVs deployed by the
United States. These drones are armed with precisionguided air-to-surface missiles, and also can collect and
transmit to their controllers intelligence collected from
imagery, infrared, signals, and other types of sensors.
Unarmed drones have been used by the United States
for many years, but it is only within the past decade
that combat versions have been used to collect intelligence on and to target terrorists and insurgents. The
first known use of an armed drone to strike at militants
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occurred in Yemen in late-2002, killing a senior al-Qaeda leader and five other men, including a U.S. citizen.1
How might the suite of technologies utilized in
armed drones change counterinsurgency outcomes?
Drone strikes are intended to be a form of selective
violence that targets bona fide insurgents while sparing noninsurgents from harm. Selective violence has
the goal of undermining insurgent organizations’ ability to plan and to engage in action, including political
activities as well as acts of violence. It can exercise this
effect both directly and indirectly. The direct punishment effect is that selective violence forces militants to
change their activities in ways that make it difficult to
engage in violence. Drone strikes kill leaders as well
as rank-and-file members of the terrorist organization,
destroy safe houses and equipment, force militants to
rely on means of communication that cannot be easily
intercepted but that are less efficient and reliable, lead
them to change their locations frequently, and create
mistrust of members of the organization who are suspected of providing intelligence to the United States or
its proxies. All of these effects raise the costs to insurgents of engaging in violence.
As important as its direct effects are, selective violence also has indirect deterrent effects that can do
long-term damage to the organization’s capacity to
sustain itself and deter current and future members
from engaging in violence. Selective violence can deter
potential recruits, who know that joining the insurgency will make them potential targets of drone strikes.
Current members of the insurgency will face stronger incentives to leave or to defect to the government,
since doing so may allow them to escape death or injury from a drone’s missiles. Supporters of the movement who provide funds, safe haven, or intelligence
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may be dissuaded from doing so by the threat that
they, too, may become the targets of selective violence.
All of these effects will be reinforced if the campaign of
selective violence can be sustained over long periods,
as the insurgency’s loss of members and recruits will
weaken its ability to achieve its aims and thus make it
less attractive to current and potential members.
Proponents hold that drones are a particularly selective form of violence. From this perspective, drone
technology has the promise of both punishing and deterring insurgent groups and minimizing risks to civilians as well as to American military forces.2 The reason is that drones combine multiple, complementary
technologies into a single platform. Drones are armed
with accurate missiles that can target individual vehicles, houses, and other structures, and even particular
rooms in a building. These precision-guided missiles
are directed by intelligence collected in real time by the
vehicle’s sensors. Drones, freed from the constraints
of the endurance of an onboard pilot, can loiter for
long periods. This allows the operators of the drone
to identify their target better before striking. It also allows the operator to ensure that any noncombatants in
the target area can be identified in advance, and that
a strike can be called off or delayed in order to avoid
civilian deaths.
These technological characteristics of armed drones
could make them more effective than traditional airpower delivered from manned aircraft. Their potential
to collect intelligence and to strike targets accurately
provides them with many of the advantages that
ground forces offer in counterinsurgency operations.
The fact that drones are pilotless means that their use
does not endanger American military personnel, potentially allowing their use in missions where the ben-

7

efit of a successful attack is outweighed by the risk of
harm to ground troops or pilots of manned strike aircraft. It may also mean that their use would generate
less public opposition to the use of force.
A large body of research concludes that the deaths
of American military personnel in combat operations
reduce the willingness of the American public to support engagement in armed conflict.3 There was a strong
relationship between mounting American casualties in
Iraq and the decline in public support for remaining
engaged in the conflict, for example.4 Since drones reduce the likelihood of casualties, they may increase the
freedom of political and military commanders to use
drones in combat operations. Remote operation also
minimizes the “footprint” of U.S. military forces in foreign countries who may be perceived as occupiers and
become the target of violence themselves.5 While all
of these technologies and characteristics have existed
independently of each other in the past, their combination allows drones to become the core element on
a counterinsurgency campaign rather than an adjunct
to operations conducted by ground forces. If drones
can effectively play these roles in a counterinsurgency strategy, their use could reduce the need for large
numbers of ground troops.
Others hold that drones are unlikely to transform
counterinsurgency radically, and that they represent
a quite modest change from past technologies of violence.6 Drones are a more evolved technique for projecting force precisely against targets over long distances,
and such technologies have, some argue, been ineffective for countering insurgencies.7 In this sense, drones
are quite similar to strikes from fixed-wing aircraft
armed with precision-guided missiles or cruise missile
strikes. Even strikes from manned aircraft frequently
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place no or very few American military personnel at
risk, because the United States is able to establish air
superiority. There are also multiple other technologies
for collecting real-time intelligence, such as high-flying
reconnaissance aircraft and satellites equipped with a
variety of sensors. Drones are still capable of missing
their target and of killing civilians inadvertently. Such
collateral damage can produce anger and resentment
against the United States. Critics increasingly charge
that the use of drones also violates international law,
and these charges may harm the reputation of the
United States concerning the upholding of the rules of
conduct regarding the use of force. This suggests that
effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorist operations will still, in at least some cases, require the United States to employ ground troops in order to prevail.
Drones, then, have two characteristics that make
their use potentially quite different from that of
“smart” bombs, cruise missiles, and other precisionguided munitions—the fact that they place no U.S. military personnel in direct risk of harm, and their ability
to serve simultaneously as both intelligence-collection
and strike platforms. Together these characteristics
may make drones more flexible and effective technologies of violence. But experience with other technologies thought to transform warfare reminds us that success in counterinsurgency involves more than the use
of overwhelming and precisely targeted force. Instead,
counterinsurgency is a political task that requires not
just, or even, killing militants but also preventing the
population from sympathizing with and supporting
these militants.8Achieving the first objective can conflict with the second. Even highly accurate weapons are
imperfect, and opponents may be able to exploit targeting errors for their own political gain. Decisionmakers
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thus would benefit from understanding the potential
of drone strikes as a tool of counterinsurgency as well
as the potential limits and downsides to their use. Subsequent sections address these issues by first positioning each perspective within established approaches to
analyze the use of force, and then summarizing what
we can conclude from empirical evidence about the effectiveness of the campaigns of drone strikes that have
been launched in recent years.
DRONES AND DETERRENCE:
THREE PERSPECTIVES
Drones as Selective Violence.
How might drone strikes influence the capacity
and behavior of the insurgent groups that they target?
A useful starting point for addressing this question is
more general work on the use of violence by public authorities. Such violence can be classified as either indiscriminate, on the one hand, or selective or discriminate,
on the other. Selective violence targets individuals
whom the authorities have good reason to believe are
members or supporters of an insurgency. Indiscriminate violence, in contrast, is targeted not at individuals,
but at a population. This “population” may consist of
any individual in a particular geographic area, members of an ethnic or religious group, or people with
other characteristics such as being young and male.9
Examples of indiscriminate violence include massacres, aerial bombing with unguided gravity bombs
or artillery shelling of civilian-populated areas, widespread arrests and imprisonment, and so on. Selective
violence includes assassinations of political and military leaders, targeted killings by snipers, fixed-wing or
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rotary aircraft, raids to capture particular individuals,
and torture directed against detained insurgents.
Selective violence is targeted only at individuals
who join or support an insurgency and should deter
current and potential members of the insurgency. Indiscriminate violence directed against civilians can,
in contrast, drive them into the arms of insurgents.
Such violence reduces the benefits of siding with the
authorities in the conflict. Insurgents may also be able
to provide supporters with incentives that further reduce such benefits, the most important of which is security from government attacks.10 Kalyvas documents
that violence against civilians is associated with subsequent militant violence in many insurgencies and civil
wars.11 The U.S. military’s counterinsurgency doctrine
stresses the importance of using force in a discriminate
fashion so as not to alienate the local population.12 The
most sophisticated and careful study of this issue concludes that air strikes, which likely victimized many
noncombatants, were associated with subsequent increases in insurgent violence in Vietnam.13
Other analysts find that governments that engage
in widespread violence and human rights abuses
against civilians are the victims of more frequent terrorist attacks.14 Most of these pieces of research focus
on widespread, indiscriminate violence committed by
the authorities. The key distinction between selective
and indiscriminate violence is that, for the former, the
authorities make efforts to collect reliable information so that they can target their violence only against
individuals who are members or active supporters
of the insurgent movement. Recall from the description above that drone strikes are closely integrated
with intelligence collection and analysis. Drones can
collect a great deal of intelligence while monitoring a
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target. This can help to ensure that the target does, in
fact, have the characteristics of a likely militant, and, in
some cases, may allow the identification of particular
individuals. Drones can also allow those authorizing
the attack to collect information about the presence of
nearby noncombatants.
American authorities emphasize that the precision
allowed by drone technology not only maximizes the
chance that insurgents will be killed, but also minimizes the likelihood that noncombatants will be victims
of drone strikes. They claim to target only individuals who, according to reliable intelligence, represent
a significant threat to the United States—when their
capture is not feasible, and when a strike is unlikely to
result in civilian deaths. In the first official discussion
of the drone strike program, a senior United States official emphasized that:
We only authorize a strike if we have a high degree of
confidence that innocent civilians will not be injured
or killed, except in the rarest of circumstances. The
unprecedented advances we have made in technology
provide us greater proximity to targets for a longer
period of time, and as a result allow us to better understand what is happening in real time on the ground
in ways that were previously impossible. We can be
much more discriminating and we can make more informed judgments about factors that might contribute
to collateral damage. I can tell you today that there
have indeed been occasions when we have decided
against conducting a strike in order to avoid the injury
or death of innocent civilians.15

It appears that drone strikes in Pakistan, the country that has experienced the most such attacks, are selective compared with other forms of violence. Avery
Plaw and Matthew Fricker developed a dataset of the
victims of drone strikes in the region.16 Their data col12

lection effort divides victims into three categories: militants, civilians, and those whose status cannot be determined. Based on a careful review of media reports,
these data measure the ratio of militants killed in drone
strikes for every civilian who dies in such attacks. Using
information only from media sources in Pakistan, they
estimate that over 26 militants are killed for each confirmed civilian death. This ratio falls slightly to 19 militants per civilian killed if they draw on both Pakistani
and international media sources. They also calculate
the same ratios for other data-collection efforts. These
data produce a ratio of 14:1 when using data from the
Long War Journal, and either 11.5:1 or 3.97:1, depending
on the specific coding rules employed, when based on
data from the New America Foundation.
The researchers then compare these ratios of militants and civilians killed by drone strikes with corresponding ratios for other types of armed conflict, including Pakistani military operations in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas and the Swat Valley, U.S.
military operations in Pakistan that use types of force
other than drones, targeted killings in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip carried out by Israel between 2000 and
2008, and all conflicts in the world in the year 2000.
All of these other types of force produce ratios that are
lower than even the lowest estimates for the proportion of civilians killed per militant by drone strikes.
This conclusion needs to be tempered by the fact that it
is quite difficult to generate accurate counts of civilian
and military victims during armed conflicts. But it also
suggests that some of the controversy about the civilian deaths produced by drone strikes may be overstated. Instead of drones killing civilians indiscriminately,
as some critics assume, the available data suggest that,
when compared with other types of force, the propor-
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tion of civilian victims is at a lower or similar level.
Furthermore, elsewhere Plaw and collaborators analyze how such ratios have evolved in the drone campaign in Pakistan. They find that the ratio of civilian to
military deaths has dropped over time. This suggests
that with experience, the United States may have improved its ability to distinguish civilian from military
targets and modify its decisions to launch strikes from
drones to minimize civilian casualties.17
Stepping back from this particular campaign, one
can find some evidence that targeted killings do undermine insurgencies more generally. Kalyvas’s survey of the use of violence by the authorities in many
insurgencies and civil wars finds consistent evidence
that selective violence degrades organizations.18 The
capture and trial of the leader of the Kurdish Workers Party in Turkey and the killing of the leader of the
Shining Path insurgency in Peru both contributed to
the decline of these insurgent organizations.19 Two
recent papers systematically analyze the effects of
leadership decapitation—the use of selective violence
(both killing and capturing) against senior members of
insurgencies—on groups’ subsequent behavior. Both
conclude that the strategy is effective. Patrick Johnston
finds that such targeted killings reduce the lethality
and frequency of insurgent attacks. He also concludes
that failed attempts at leadership decapitation do not
increase the violence that insurgents undertake, suggesting that the strategy has few negative consequences for states that use it.20 Bryan Price concludes that
targeted killings substantially shorten the life spans of
terrorist groups. He argues that organizational characteristics of terrorist groups, including their use of violence, clandestine structure, and focus on values, make
them particularly susceptible to targeted killings.21
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Drone Strikes and the Resilience of
Insurgent Organizations.
A second perspective holds that attempts to deliver
violence selectively against leaders of insurgent movements are usually ineffective. This is because efforts
to carefully target such violence too frequently fail, or
many insurgent organizations are quite resilient to the
loss of individual members.
Drone strikes are similar to targeted killings and
the use of air power in counterinsurgency campaigns.
All of these types of violence seek to target leaders and
other key members of insurgent organizations, and
integrate intelligence into their targeting decisions.
Targeted killings have been defined as “the intentional killing of a specific civilian or unlawful combatant
who cannot reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at
the direction of the state, in the context of an international or noninternational armed conflict.”22 The most
extensive and well-documented campaign of targeted
killings is that conducted by Israel against Palestinian
militant organizations. Israel has used missiles fired
from drones and from helicopters, bombs dropped
from fixed-wing aircraft, armed raids, and snipers to
kill militants.23 There is a small literature that assesses
the effectiveness of these targeted killings. Researchers
have collected open-source data about the occurrence
of targeted killings, the outcome (such as the death of
the targeted individual or others), and subsequent acts
of violence by insurgent and terrorist groups. Findings
are mixed; most of these studies conclude that targeted
killings do not lead to a decline in subsequent terrorist attacks. Two papers find that targeted killings con-
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ducted by Israeli forces had no effect on subsequent attacks by Palestinian terrorists between 2000 and 2005.24
An analysis focused on suicide terrorism in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict concludes that targeted killings are
associated with fewer victims of suicide attacks, and
that high levels of targeted killings reduce Palestinian
intentions to launch terrorist attacks.25
Why might such targeted killings be ineffective?
Work on air power in war suggests one reason. Robert
Pape argues that air strikes directed at military targets
and infrastructure—a strategy of denial—is more effective in coercing an opponent than is bombing civilian targets.26 However, this effect depends on the target’s military strategy:
Strategies that rely on large-scale mechanized operations are particularly vulnerable because they depend
on massive logistic flows that make excellent targets
for air attack. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
guerrilla fighters are much less vulnerable to coercion
because they need little logistical support.27

Effective coercion of insurgents requires separating
them from the population that provides them with support. This is difficult to achieve with air power alone,
since the groups targeted for attack typically lack the
logistical infrastructure, clear control of territory, and
massed personnel that make a strategy of denial effective.28 Pape’s subsequent study of counterterrorism
strategies concludes that targeted killings are not effective against terrorist groups that undertake suicide
attack campaigns. Of the 13 groups in his study, only
one was undermined by targeted killings.29
Other analysts also connect the failure of selective
violence to the organizational characteristics of insurgent groups. An important analysis of targeted killings
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aimed at top commanders of terrorist organizations—
leadership decapitation—finds that they do contribute
to the collapse of smaller and newer organizations that
are not motivated by religious grievances.30 Among the
organizations that survived leadership decapitation,
some subsequently engaged in fewer terrorist attacks,
but others actually increased their use of violence.
Larger and older groups have the resources and time
to develop organizational practices, such as succession
plans and standard operating procedures that will allow them to survive the loss of key members. Many
observers point out that even large terrorist groups,
such as al-Qaeda, are careful to organize themselves
in networks.31 Rather than functioning as hierarchies
in which leaders plan and organize attacks, they allow
smaller cells of terrorists to operate on their own initiative. These cells might be better positioned to alter
their behavior to avoid targeted killings strikes by, for
example, no longer traveling in groups or by remaining in the same location for extended periods of time.
If this is the case, killing leaders should have a small,
or even no, effect on the subsequent activities of the
group. Network structures also limit how far the effects of selective violence diffuse within the insurgent
organization. Wiping out the leader of one cell may
have small effects on other cells because these are only
loosely coupled to each other.
Drone Strikes as Indiscriminate Violence.
Even carefully targeted killings often kill or injure
individuals with little direct connection to an insurgent organization. President Barack Obama and others
have publicly acknowledged that drones have killed
or injured noncombatants, while stressing that such
collateral damage is rare and that great care is taken
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to avoid civilian harm.32 Civilian deaths can provide
insurgents with political gains that outweigh the harm
inflicted by successful targeted killings. Insurgent
organizations can publicize civilian deaths in propaganda campaigns aimed at mobilizing supporters,
by portraying the authorities as a direct threat to civilians. They can emphasize to the larger population,
which may not feel vulnerable to targeted killings, that
civilian victims share their ethnic, religious, and national identities, and are thus worthy of support. This
also makes it easier for terrorists to justify their own
use of violence against civilian targets as necessary
in the face of a more powerful and threatening state
security apparatus.
This has been the central criticism of the drone
campaign’s effectiveness—civilian deaths from drone
strikes create powerful grievances against the United
States and the Pakistani authorities, and insurgents
magnify these grievances through their propaganda—leading individuals and groups to lend direct or
indirect support to insurgent organizations. These organizations use these newfound resources to launch
more terrorist attacks in Pakistan. This position has
been articulated by influential analysts in the United States and by former intelligence officials of the
U.S. Government.33
Insurgents’ attempts to portray drone strikes as indiscriminate are facilitated by the ambiguous status of
targeted killings under international law. The drone
campaign involves the use of force against militants in
Pakistan, but the United States is not at war with Pakistan. Even if drone strikes kill bona fide militants, these
individuals may not be, at the time of their deaths, always involved in direct combat with the United States
in Afghanistan.
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Drone strikes can thus be plausibly described as
violating the prohibition of international human rights
law against extra-judicial killings. The best available
data suggest that drone strikes are more selective than
many other types of violence. Insurgents, though, seek
to use a different frame to interpret drone strikes. The
frame comparing drones to other types of attacks suggests that drones result in fewer civilian deaths. The
frame that insurgents use instead casts drone strikes
as violations of international law and universal moral
precepts. From this perspective, any civilian deaths
caused by drones are unacceptable. The ability of insurgents to convince an audience to accept this frame
is facilitated by the fact that it is not easy for independent media organizations to interview victims of drone
strikes immediately after they occur.34 This difficulty
in categorizing those killed by drones as combatants
or civilians is not simply the creation of the insurgent
organizations’ propaganda efforts. Instead, it reflects
a real debate about how consistent drone strikes are
with international human rights law.35 Al-Qaeda and
allied groups have used drone strikes as part of their
propaganda campaign to mobilize recruits and financial donations from overseas, portraying the strikes as
unfair exploitation of technology by a more powerful foe unwilling to risk the lives of its own soldiers
and citizens.36
Drone strikes have aroused considerable controversy about civilian deaths in Pakistan. One survey
conducted in the tribal areas of Pakistan, where most
drone strikes occur, suggests that most respondents
believe that the drones kill more noncombatants than
militants. Respondents were asked if drones “accurately target militants” or “largely kill civilians.” Only
16.2 percent of respondents expressed the belief that
drones accurately kill militants alone, while 47.8 per19

cent concluded that they kill civilians, and an additional 33.1 percent stated that drones kill both militants and
civilians.37 This reaction may also have complicated
Pakistani cooperation with the United States. The government has at times supported the drone campaign;
at least until 2011, some drones were flown from a
military base in Pakistan, and Pakistani military intelligence channeled information about the identity and
location of militants to the United States. But the political sensitivities that drone strikes arouse have also
led the authorities to officially condemn the campaign.
On some occasions, Pakistani officials have sought to
limit the areas of the country where drone strikes take
place and to evict American drones from their base
in Pakistan.38
There may be another mechanism through which
drone strikes and other forms of targeted killings influence insurgent violence.39 The idea, outlined above,
that selective violence deters individuals from joining
or supporting an insurgent movement assumes there
is one cohesive insurgency. Quite frequently, however,
there is a great deal of fragmentation in insurgencies.
More than one insurgent organization has used violence in almost half of all civil wars since 1989, for example.40 Fragmented insurgencies have been defined
as those with multiple organizations, weak institutional links among these organizations, and roughly equal
distributions of power among their constituent organizations.41 The dynamics of fragmented insurgencies
are distinct from those of cohesive insurgencies,42 and
an emerging body of research suggests that fragmented civil wars last longer,43 are more likely to experience
in-fighting44 and more defections to the government,45
and bargain in different ways with the authorities.46
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Fragmentation makes it more difficult for the authorities to employ selective violence. The groups
comprising fragmented insurgencies hold different
preferences regarding long-term goals, their strategies
of violence, relations with the authorities, and other
issues. The result is that “cooperation among factions of a single dissident group and among separate
dissident organizations is rare.”47 In such situations,
the authorities frequently prefer to direct their violence only against members of one or a few insurgent
movements, while sparing members of other insurgent organizations. One could imagine, for example,
targeting members of insurgent organizations that oppose peace negotiations and compromise, while not
targeting members of organizations willing to participate in such talks. This would increase the pressure
on groups more strongly opposed to the authorities
and encourage more moderate groups to split from
them. But this level of discrimination in targeting
may be difficult to achieve, because insurgencies are
not regular armed forces. Instead, they typically do
not wear uniforms, do not control well-defined areas
of territory for long periods, seek to mask their communications and the identity of their supporters from
outside scrutiny, and draw on the same population for
recruits. In such circumstances, it may be practically
impossible for the authorities to develop sufficiently
accurate intelligence that allows them to determine the
specific organizational affiliation of a suspected militant or small group of militants. Drones, of course, can
collect a great deal of intelligence about the location,
movements, and communications of individuals, but
this alone may not be sufficient to determine organizational affiliation among irregular forces. Human intelligence sources can supplement technical means of
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intelligence collection, but may have personal incentives to identify individuals incorrectly as members
of an insurgent organization targeted by the authorities.48 The common insurgent tactic of hiding among
the population makes it difficult for the authorities to
solve the “identification problem” of distinguishing
combatants and noncombatants.49 Fragmentation creates a similar problem of determining if a particular
militant is a member of an unsurgent organization
targeted for selective violence, or belongs to another
insurgent group against whom the government is not
using force.
Fragmented insurgents mean that the authorities
have two options when contemplating the use of selective violence. On the one hand, they can decline to use
violence except in the (rare) cases when they are certain of the organizational affiliation of the target. The
cost of this approach, of course, is that it may lead to
few attacks on insurgents. Alternatively, the authorities can engage in “profiling,” understood as attacking all or every person who has the characteristics of
an insurgent. If these characteristics are very precisely
defined and sufficient intelligence exists for them to
be acted upon, this should result in attacks primarily
on insurgents and should exercise a deterrent effect
on those considering joining or supporting the movement. Note, though, that among the group of individuals who match the profile of a militant developed by
the authorities, such violence is indiscriminate. Anyone matching the characteristics of the insurgent profile could be the victim of state violence, even if he or
she is not a member of an insurgent organization that
the state chooses to target. From the perspective of the
individual militant, this reduces the difference in the
costs of being a member of an insurgent organization
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that the state opposes strongly and one of an insurgency that does not attract such opposition. Indeed, in
such a situation, the rewards of joining or allying with
the insurgency most hostile to the authorities can be
greater if it provides selective incentives that increase
the chance of survival, such as safe havens, money or
weapons, or intelligence about how to avoid being
targeted by the state.50 In such situations, then, selectively targeting militants from disparate organizations
may lead them to coalesce to launch violent attacks on
the state.
DRONES AND COUNTERINSURGENCY:
WHAT DOES THE EVIDENCE TELL US?
The policy and scholarly literature has produced
a wide range of sometimes-competing expectations
about how selective violence can influence the structure and behavior of terrorist and insurgent groups.
Many of these perspectives challenge the conclusion,
which motivates U.S. policy, that drone strikes will be
exceptionally effective in undermining such groups.
This diversity of expectations also makes it difficult
to draw conclusions about the likely effects of drone
strikes. One way to address this issue is to look at the
empirical evidence on the relationships between drone
strikes and various measures of insurgent activity. The
U.S. campaign of drone strikes in Pakistan, in particular, has been going on for a long enough period that
researchers and scholars have been able to collect data
systematically about the occurrence of such strikes and
the civilian and militant deaths they produce, and then
to relate these to insurgent activity. This section discusses the sources of this data, their validity and reliability, and the results of the research on strikes and
insurgency in this region of the world.
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Challenges in Measuring Drone Strikes
and Insurgent Activity.
Consider first how we understand insurgent activity. Insurgent groups engage in many activities—violence directed against combatants and noncombatants,
recruiting new members, controlling territory, raising
funds, generating propaganda, and so on. U.S. policy
would expect that drone strikes would both undermine
the targeted group’s capacity to engage in most of these
activities and deter them from taking such actions in
the future. According to the National Strategy for Counterterrorism issued by the White House in June 2011,
the “most solemn” counterterrorism goal of the United
States is to “protect the American people, homeland,
and American interests.” The National Strategy names
al-Qaeda as the principal international challenge to this
goal, and identifies further goals specific to the group
that could be met, in part, by drone strikes. These include to “disrupt, degrade, dismantle, and defeat”
al-Qaeda and related groups, eliminating safe havens
used by al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and weakening
the links between al-Qaeda and other violent groups.
At the same time, other goals outlined in the strategy
document could conceivably be undermined by drone
strikes. These include “building enduring counterterrorism partnerships,” countering al-Qaeda’s ideology
and propaganda, and depriving the movement of the
sources of financial support and recruits.51
There are thus multiple types of insurgent activity
that might be measured, and drone strikes might have
distinct effects on each of these. But it is difficult for
researchers to obtain the underlying information they
would need to measure these concepts because both
insurgents and the authorities behave strategically. In-
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surgents deliberately mask their activities precisely so
they will not be targeted with attacks by the authorities. Governments collect secret intelligence but do not
make it available to outside researchers for fear of revealing their sources and methods to the insurgents.
Researchers are thus quite limited in the types of insurgent activity they can actually measure.
One important type of insurgent activity that can
be observed and measured is terrorist attacks, understood as public acts of violence against noncombatants.
Such attacks are intended to influence a mass audience, meaning that the insurgents that carry them out
expect that their occurrence and consequences will be
a matter of public record. Terrorist attacks are a limited
measure of the capacity of insurgent groups. They may
not reflect insurgents’ ability to carry out other acts of
violence, such as those directed against military forces.
It is possible that insurgents resort to more terrorist attacks when they are weakening, because noncombatants are easier and less dangerous to target. Furthermore, it is not clear if we should measure all acts of
terrorism, or only those directed against the United
States. One obvious candidate that is consistent with
the goals outlined in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy document would be actual and planned attacks by
al-Qaeda or affiliated groups against the U.S. homeland. But such attacks are too few in number to yield
reliable conclusions about the underlying capacity of
the groups carrying them out. Instead, those seeking
a systematic evaluation of the effects of drone strikes
have most frequently analyzed terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and/or Pakistan. A common source measuring such attacks is the Worldwide Incidents Tracking
System (WITS) database. WITS draws on open sources
of information, such as news stories and reports by
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nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), to construct
a list of terrorist incidents. An incident is considered a
terrorist attack if:
sub-national or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and assets outside
war zones and war-like settings).52

WITS has the advantage over other terrorist datasets of being updated regularly, allowing the researcher to determine which types of terrorist attacks should
be included, and including both domestic and transnational attacks in its data.
Measuring the occurrence of drone strikes presents fewer challenges. Strikes are widely reported on
international media, such as wire services, as well as
in media outlets in Pakistan. Journalists can seek to
confirm the occurrence of a drone strike with sources
in the U.S. Government, Pakistani civilian and military authorities, and militant organizations. While all
of these sources have powerful incentives to shape
reporting on the consequences of drone strikes, such
as civilian deaths, it is not obvious that their interests
would be served by systematically inflating or deflating where and when such strikes occur. Doing so
would undermine their credibility with the media. It
might also prove ineffective, since journalists can triangulate among sources with different agendas and
report only those strikes that are confirmed by more
than one source. The New America Foundation, the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, and the Long War
Journal have all produced datasets that count the occurrence of drone strikes. All three base their information primarily on reports in reliable media sources.
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These include Western newspapers, such as The New
York Times, news wire services and broadcast networks
such as the BBC, and leading English-language newspapers and a broadcast network in Pakistan. They also
rely on reports from NGOs, evidence presented in legal
cases, and leaked documents. In addition, the Bureau
of Investigative Journalism also undertook its own
field investigations to measure civilian deaths. These
datasets produce very similar counts of drone strikes,
suggesting that the differences in their methods of data
collection exert little systematic bias.53
More difficult to measure are the consequences of
such drone strikes. None of the data-collection efforts
have been able to determine accurately which specific insurgent or terrorist groups have been the targets
of drone strikes. The New America Foundation does
seek to identify the organizational affiliation of militants targeted by drones, but has been able to do so in
less than two-thirds of the cases. Both New America
and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism have also
sought to count the number of militants and noncombatants killed in drone strikes. This is more challenging than accounting for the occurrence of a drone
strike for a number of reasons. First, drone strikes take
place in remote areas of Pakistan, where it is dangerous for journalists and researchers to operate and to
identify victims. Second, the categories “militant” and
“noncombatant” may not be mutually exclusive. One
can imagine individuals who (voluntarily or not) provide some support to insurgents, such as housing or
transportation, but do not engage in violence themselves being counted inadvertently as militants. Third,
the difficulties of gaining access to the region where
strikes occur and ambiguity about the affiliations of
victims give both governments and insurgents incen-
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tives to assume that any victims fall into the category that assists the organization’s goals. So, insurgent
organizations may define victims as civilians, both to
demonstrate that they are not themselves directly affected by drone strikes, as well as to emphasize the inhumanity of such strikes. Not surprisingly, there is a
vigorous debate between these data-collection efforts
and others over which dataset more accurately reflects
the number and identity of drone-strike victims.54
Effects of Drone Strikes on Insurgent Activity.
With these limitations in mind, these data can be
used to assess the effects of drone strikes on insurgent
activity. A starting point is to analyze how insurgent
attacks have evolved over time as the pace of drone
strikes has increased or decreased. This co-relational
approach is widely used by policy analysts; reports by
both the New America Foundation and the Long War
Journal frequently use this approach in their assessments of the effectiveness of drone strikes. As we shall
see, though, this type of analysis has important limits
that make it difficult to draw conclusions about how
drone strikes influence insurgent groups. A better approach is to use various forms of regression analysis
that include techniques for tackling some of these limitations. This section also summarizes and assesses the
conclusions of a number of such analyses.
Figures 1 through 6 depict how drone strikes, militant and civilian deaths, and terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan have evolved from 2006 through
the third quarter of 2011.55 The data are presented as
30-day moving averages to smooth any sharp changes
and facilitate the detection of relationships between the
variables. Figures 1 and 2 compare the number of
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Figure 1. Drone Strikes and Terrorist Attacks
in Afghanistan (30-Day Moving Averages).

Figure 2. Drone Strikes and Terrorist Attacks in
Pakistan (30-Day Moving Averages).

29

Figure 3. Civilian Deaths and Terrorist Attacks in
Afghanistan (30-Day Moving Averages).

Figure 4. Civilian Deaths and Terrorist Attacks
in Pakistan (30-Day Moving Averages).
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Figure 5. Militant Deaths and Terrorist Attacks
in Afghanistan (30-Day Moving Averages).

Figure 6. Militant Deaths and Terrorist Attacks
in Pakistan (30-Day Moving Averages).
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drone strikes with the number of terrorist attacks in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, respectively. Until at least
early-2011, there does appear to be a reasonably consistent relationship among these time series. However,
the pattern is not one that would be expected by the
deterrence interpretation of drone strikes. Instead of
drone strikes leading to a subsequent fall in the number of terrorist attacks, the pattern is one in which
increases in terrorism are followed by more drone
strikes. Something similar characterizes the data for
Pakistan through 2010. After this date, though, a spike
in drone strikes is closely associated with a decline in
terrorist activity, suggesting that drones may have had
their desired effect.
Recall that the most prominent criticism of drone
strikes is that they produce inadvertent civilian casualties, which makes some individuals more willing to
support insurgent organizations, which, in turn, allows these organizations more capacity to engage in
violence. Figures 3 and 4 assess this relationship by
plotting the number of civilians killed in drone strikes
along with the number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan. No clear patterns emerge. In Afghanistan, the number of terrorist attacks is highest in
2010 and 2011, during which time the number of civilian casualties from drones appears to be declining
or holding steady. Terrorism in Pakistan and drone
victims both increase from 2008 to 2010. Terrorist attacks stabilize in 2010 and then decline in 2011, as do
the number of civilian casualties.
These weak relationships are not clearly consistent
with the argument that more civilian casualties fuel
terrorist attacks. Figures 5 and 6 chart the number of
militants killed by drone strikes and terrorist attacks in
the two countries. In Afghanistan, there is a very close
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relationship between these two variables, although it
appears that spikes in terrorist attacks precede, rather
than follow, increases in militant deaths from drones.
The pattern for Pakistan is more complicated. Prior to
2010, spikes in terrorist attacks are followed by more
drone strikes that kill militants. After this, however,
the number of terrorist incidents stabilizes and then
falls. During the same period, there are sharp spikes in
the number of militants that die in drone strikes, suggesting that such deaths might reduce the capacity of
insurgent organizations to engage in terrorism.
Plots similar to these are the means through which
relationships between drone strikes and the capacity
of insurgent organizations are typically analyzed by
policymakers and outside experts. But these visual
relationships have a number of weaknesses, which
make it difficult to assess the effects of drone strikes.
First, the number of data points is so large that it may
not be possible to detect subtle relationships, and the
changes in such relationships, through simple visual
inspection of the data. Second, it seems likely that
any effects of drone strikes would operate with a lag.
If drone strikes inhibit the recruitment of insurgents,
for example, this might not result in a reduction in the
capacity of insurgent organizations to engage in terrorism for some weeks or months. Conversely, civilian
deaths from drone strikes may cause sympathizers to
transfer resources to insurgent organizations, but this
would likely take some time to organize. It is possible,
then, that the absence of many clear simultaneous relationships in Figures 1 through 6 is due to the lack of
any reliable way of accounting for such lags. Third, it is
possible that any effect of drone strikes on insurgents
depends on other factors in addition to drone strikes.
The decline in terrorist attacks in Afghanistan in late-
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2010 and again in late-2011 may not be due to the increased tempo of drone strikes during this period, but
instead to successful counterinsurgency activities by
Afghan and allied forces operating in the country after
the “surge” of American military personnel that began
in 2009.
A more sophisticated way of modeling the effects of
drones on insurgency is to use various forms of regression analysis. This allows a consistent and systematic
interpretation of the large amount of data available on
drone strikes and their consequences. Regression analysis permits one to use these data to determine the appropriate lengths of any lagged relationships between
drones and insurgency. It also allows one to estimate
how other factors, such as the surge, mediate the relationships between drone strikes and insurgency. At
least four working papers use regression techniques to
develop more sophisticated understandings of these
relationships. These projects employ distinct research
designs and strategies and produce some overlapping
but also some distinct results and conclusions. Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each should allow
future work to build more reliable models of the effects
of drone strikes on political violence.
The first effort, by Johnston and Sarbahi, focuses on
how drones influence terrorism in the FATA, which is
the region that many of the groups targeted by drones
use as a base.56 They use the agency—which is the
third order administrative region in Pakistan—as the
basic unit of analysis. There are eight such agencies in
the FATA region of Pakistan. Using the New America
Foundation data on drone strikes and WITS data on
terrorism, they code the date and agency in which each
drone strike or terrorist attack occurs from March 2004
through June 2010. Johnson and Sarbahi use four dis-

34

tinct measures of terrorist attacks: the number of overall attacks, the number of deaths that result from these
attacks, the number of attacks that rely on improvised
explosive devices, and the number that employ suicide
attacks. They find that the simple correlation between
drone strikes and these measures of insurgent violence is positive, suggesting that drones are associated
with more, not fewer, terrorist attacks. Johnson and
Sarbahi suggest that this positive relationship could be
due, in part, to reverse causality if the United States
is more likely to launch drone strikes when there is
more violence occurring in the targeted agency. Terrorist attacks might reveal information that allows
the United States to target its drone strikes, and an
escalation of insurgent violence in a particular agency might motivate the United States to heighten the
pace of strikes to deter more such violence. To control such interdependence between the decisions to
launch drone strikes and terrorist attacks, Johnson and
Sarbahi employ fixed-effects estimation, which accounts for differences between agencies that do not
change over time—such as population or elevation—
as well as first-differencing of the independent and
dependent variables. When these techniques are employed, the relationship between drone strikes and
most measures of insurgent violence becomes negative, indicating that the drones may be reducing the
ability or willingness of these groups to undertake attacks. The analysts caution, though, that the substantive size of the reductions in terrorist attacks associated
with drone strikes is rather small. This suggests that
while drones may be an effective tactic in disrupting
insurgent organizations, they are unlikely to be successful as the primary basis for a strategy aimed at defeating al-Qaeda and related groups.
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Johnson and Sarbahi’s working paper employs a
sophisticated research design with the goal of minimizing the chance of finding a spurious relationship
between drone strikes and terrorism due to the strategic interaction of decisionmakers in the United States
and the targeted insurgent organizations. The authors
are also careful to point out that future work in this
area could perhaps more fully understand the influence of drones. In particular, this working paper uses
as its independent variable the occurrence and location of a drone strike. It does not, for example, seek
to measure the direct consequences of such strikes,
including how many “high-value” targets, militants,
and civilians are killed or injured. As discussed above,
each of these consequences could have distinct effects
on subsequent insurgent violence. Furthermore, it is
possible that drone strikes launched against targets in
the FATA influence the levels of insurgent violence in
other regions. For example, we might expect that insurgents targeted by drones are those most active in
the Afghan theater, so including measures of violence
in this country would seem appropriate. It is also possible that insurgent organizations based in the FATA
might calibrate the amount of violence that they use
outside of this region in Pakistan. Many insurgents
have used drone strikes to justify heightened conflict
with the government of Pakistan. This could lead such
insurgents to respond to drone strikes by deliberately
escalating their attacks in other, more populous, and
politically important regions of the country that receive greater media attention in order to maximize the
political impact of their violence.
A second working paper uses a different research
strategy to address some of these issues.57 It also uses
data from the New America Foundation and the WITS
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database, counting the number of terrorist attacks in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The authors measure
both the occurrence of drone strikes as well as the success of the strikes in killing leaders of a militant group.
David Jaeger and Zahra Siddique account for the strategic interaction between terrorism and drone strikes
in the two countries by including the lagged values of
each of these variables in models using terrorist attacks
in Afghanistan or in Pakistan as the dependent variable. They find that drone strikes have no consistent
relationship to terrorist violence in Afghanistan. In the
researchers’ baseline models, there is some evidence
that drones lead to less terrorism in Pakistan; a drone
strike today, for example, is associated with fewer terrorist attacks 2, 12, and 13 days in the future. But the
same strike is also associated with more terrorist attacks in Pakistan 5 days later. These relationships depend on how the models aggregate time, disappearing when data are grouped in weeks or months.58 They
also disaggregate the presumed targets of the drone
strikes. The Haqqani network, based in North Waziristan, engages in considerable violence in Afghanistan. Jaeger and Siddique’s model suggests that drone
strikes reduce the capacity of the Haqqani network to
respond with violence in the subsequent week, but
that the network undertakes considerably more terrorist attacks in the second week after a drone strike. They
replicate this sort of analysis for the Tehrik-e-Taliban
in South Waziristan, finding a somewhat different pattern, with drone strikes in this region associated with
both increases and decreases in terrorist attacks at
various points in the future. Finally, the researchers’
models—including measures of successful and unsuccessful drone strikes—find that these result in substantively similar outcomes, indicating that drone strikes
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that kill militant leaders do not fundamentally alter the
patterns of violence in Pakistan.
What conclusions can we draw from these statistical
analyses? First, a consistent finding across these models is that drone strikes do not influence the amounts
of terrorist violence that occur in Afghanistan. To the
extent that reducing such violence is an important objective of the strikes, this finding suggests that drones
are not an effective tool for achieving this goal. Second, the relationships between drone strikes and terrorist attacks in Pakistan are quite variable. In most of
the models reported here, drone strikes are associated
with both an increase and a decrease in subsequent terrorism. This could occur if, for example, drone strikes
have an immediate effect of reducing the capacity of
insurgent organizations by, for example, killing members who were about to engage in violence, but also
have a longer-run effect in which those upset by the
strikes provide the insurgency with more recruits and
other resources, allowing it to undertake more attacks.
However, the temporal pattern of negative and positive links between drone strikes and terrorism is not
very consistent across the specifications of the different
models, making it difficult to determine if the relationships are simply due to chance or if they reflect some
difficulty discerning an underlying pattern. Third, the
paper by Jaeger and Siddique does recognize the possibility that different insurgent organizations respond to
drone strikes in different ways, and that drone strikes
with different consequences—such as killing a militant
leader or not—can have quite distinct consequences
for subsequent political violence. Although Jaeger and
Siddique’s findings on these relationships are not very
robust, they do suggest important issues that future
work on drone strikes could tackle.
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One example is a working paper focused on the
influence of fragmentation.59 This paper discusses
how the organization of insurgency mediates the response to drone strikes. It suggests that drone strikes
are unlikely to have much of an effect on large, cohesive insurgencies such as the Taliban operations in
Afghanistan. Drone strikes are likely to incite more cooperation among, and violence by, more fragmented
insurgencies, such as those operating in Pakistan. Furthermore, the authors hypothesize that drones are sufficiently capable of distinguishing militants from civilians so that strikes that kill civilians should be small
in number and thus not lead, as many claim, to more
support for political violence committed by insurgent
organizations. To evaluate these propositions, the paper also uses WITS data on the number of terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. The key independent variables are the occurrence of drone strikes, the
number of militants killed by drones, and the number
of civilian victims of drones. Consistent with the work
of Jaeger and Siddique, the authors find that none of
these measures of drone strikes have any statistical
relationship to terrorist violence in Afghanistan. This
study reinforces the conclusion that drones have little
effect, positive or negative, on the security situation in
Afghanistan. It also finds a strong, positive relationship between drone strikes and subsequent terrorist
attacks in Pakistan, suggesting that drones help fuel
political violence in the country.
To shed light on what factors are driving this relationship, the authors ran additional models, using the
numbers of militants and of civilians killed by drones as
independent variables. Civilian deaths in drone strikes
are unrelated to subsequent terrorist attacks. This finding is inconsistent with the argument that anger about
civilian deaths makes it easier for terrorist organiza39

tions to recruit new members and supporters and to use
these resources to engage in greater violence. Instead,
the authors find that drone strikes that kill militants are
associated with increases in terrorist attacks. From the
perspective of U.S. policy, which expects drone strikes
to undermine the capacity of insurgent organizations
to engage in violence by killing their current members
and deterring potential members, this relationship is
surprising. It is consistent, however, with the argument that the fragmented nature of the insurgency in
Pakistan—combined with the technological capacity
of drones to distinguish civilians from militants with
some accuracy—has fostered a more cohesive focus by
these militants on launching terrorist attacks against
the Pakistani state.
One concern with all of these analyses is that they
do not directly address the core U.S. priority articulated in its counterterrorism strategy—disrupting and
degrading al-Qaeda. As discussed earlier, there are
good reasons for this; it is difficult to obtain reliable
information about al-Qaeda’s activities and plots. The
studies discussed use terrorist attacks in Afghanistan
and Pakistan as proxies for the strength of insurgent
movements located in these countries. But these proxies may be only weakly related to the strength of alQaeda. A final project discussed here addresses this
issue by measuring the propaganda output of al-Qaeda as an alternative proxy for the group’s capacity.60
Propaganda output is a useful proxy for two reasons.
First, producing effective propaganda is an important
objective of most terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.
The group’s most senior leaders have repeatedly emphasized this point. Osama bin Laden stated that “the
media war of this century is one of the strongest methods” of terrorism, and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, claimed that, “We are in a battle, and more than
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half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of
the media.”61
Second, propaganda output is a proxy for al-Qaeda’s capacity to organize political action that can be
observed and measured. This is not the case for many
other types of terrorist group activity, such as the ability to raise funds or to attract recruits. The project uses
regression analysis based on weekly data measuring
the occurrence of drone strikes, the incidence of propaganda output, and the duration of propaganda produced by al-Qaeda from January 2006 through November 2011. The evidence leads to the conclusion that
drone strikes have not been effective in reducing alQaeda’s propaganda output. From the perspective of
its ability to generate propaganda, al-Qaeda appears
to be resilient to the threat of drone strikes. This could
mean that, while drone strikes have killed many militants associated with the group, they have not been
very effective in undermining its ability to plan and undertake complex political and media relations actions.
As noted above, drone strikes also involve some costs
for the United States. Perhaps the most important cost
is political. Foes of the United States decry the fact that
some drone strikes kill or injure noncombatants. This
could reduce political support for the entire range of
U.S. counterterrorist operations in Pakistan in particular. The findings suggest that the gains of drone strikes
in terms of undermining al-Qaeda may be smaller than
many believe.
POLICY AND STRATEGY IMPLICATIONS
Drones have become an important component of
U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in multiple regions of the world. They appear to
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have a number of advantages that could fundamentally alter how the United States and other countries
engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations. Drones place no U.S. military personnel
at risk. They do not require a large “footprint” of U.S.
personnel overseas. They are armed with accurate missiles that have the capacity to target individuals, automobiles, and sections of structures, such as rooms in
a large house. Perhaps the most consequential advantage of drones is their ability to integrate intelligence
collection with decisions to use force. Drones can collect intelligence directly with their own sensors. Their
ability to linger for long periods allows this real-time
intelligence to be combined with other intelligence
sources while a target is being monitored. These characteristics should make drones especially effective in
targeting only the individuals against whom the United States wishes to use force, and minimizing harm
to noncombatants. This highly selective use of force,
which minimizes harm to civilians, has the potential
to allow the United States to achieve its counterinsurgency objectives at lower cost and risk. Selective violence increases the risks to individuals of joining or
supporting an insurgency. This should make it more
difficult for insurgent organizations to retain their current members, to recruit new members, and to increase
support from sympathetic individuals outside the organization. At the same time, highly selective violence
minimizes the risks faced by civilian noncombatants.
This means that anger and resentment directed at the
United States should be reduced.
The evidence and analyses discussed here, however, suggest that, to date, drone strikes have not fulfilled
this promise. The historical record provides many examples of cases in which selective violence was suc-
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cessful in undermining insurgencies. At the same time,
though, there are many cases in which such violence
backfired or was ineffective. One reason may be that
some insurgent organizations are large and resilient
enough to survive the deaths of their leaders and
rank-and-file members. Furthermore, the most selective forms of violence can lead to civilian casualties.
Insurgent and terrorist organizations can exploit even
a small number of civilian deaths to depict their opponents as ruthless and uncaring. The objective of such
propaganda campaigns is to convince the population
that these opponents are actually using indiscriminate
violence, and that noncombatants face considerable
risks of harm. This is perhaps the most common criticism of the U.S. drone campaign. Many observers suggest that any degradation of insurgent organizations
caused by drone strikes is outweighed by the ability
of such organizations to exploit even small numbers of
civilian casualties, with the goals of persuading people
to join or support the insurgency. While there is considerable evidence that drone strikes are actually quite
selective when compared with other types of violence,
this fact may be unimportant if insurgent organizations can convince the population otherwise.
Another criticism of the drone strike campaign
focuses less on civilian deaths and more on the relationships among insurgent organizations. This holds
that the small number of civilian deaths produced by
drones compared with other types of violence should,
in fact, be recognized by the population. Fewer civilian
deaths should result in less mobilization by noncombatants on the side of insurgent organizations. Drones,
then, have the capacity to distinguish militants from civilians, and to focus most of their violence on militant
targets. The difficulty that drones face is that they can-
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not reliably distinguish the organizational affiliation of
militants. The intelligence collection and analysis tools
that drones possess are less capable of figuring out if
a militant or group of militants is a core member of
one insurgent organization or another. This presents a
real problem where multiple insurgent organizations
are operating, and the United States does not wish to
target all of them. In such situations, violence is selective in the sense that it sorts militants from civilians,
but is indiscriminate among militants with different
organizational affiliations. This provides insurgent organizations with fewer reasons to avoid targeting or
otherwise angering the United States, because there is
a good chance that members of such organizations will
be targeted with drone strikes regardless of what they
do. When facing multiple, difficult-to-distinguish, insurgent organizations, drone strikes and other forms
of selective violence may actually promote cooperation among these groups and lead them to focus more
of their energies on using violence in ways that undermine U.S. goals.
To address these issues, a number of researchers
have investigated the relationships between the occurrence of drone strikes and various types of behavior by
insurgent and terrorist groups with links to Pakistan.
These research efforts have not yet produced a consensus on how drones influence insurgent organizations.
However, one reasonably consistent finding across the
spectrum of analysis is that drone strikes have little
influence, positive or negative, on the amount of insurgent violence that occurs in Afghanistan. This is
important, because one objective of the drone strike
campaign is to weaken and undermine insurgent organizations based in Pakistan that launch attacks against
American, Afghan, and international military forces as
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well as civilians in Afghanistan. The studies conducted
to date would suggest that this objective of the drone
campaign is not being met. Another, more tentative,
conclusion that can be drawn from existing research is
that drone strikes that result in civilian deaths appear
to have little relationship with subsequent insurgent
violence. This suggests that insurgent organizations
have not been very effective at leveraging such deaths
in their propaganda to secure more support.
If this is the case, it seems that harm inflicted on
noncombatants, while regrettable, does not immediately undermine U.S. goals in the region. Another finding is that drone strikes that kill militants in Pakistan
are associated with increases in subsequent insurgent
violence in the country. The fact that there are multiple,
difficult-to-distinguish, insurgent organizations operating in western Pakistan may make it difficult for the
operators of drone strikes to determine reliably the organizational affiliation of their targets. This fact could
be creating a dynamic in which all insurgent organizations, even those that have few grievances against the
United States and the government of Pakistan or that
engage in low levels of violence, feel threatened by the
drones and seek support from other insurgent organizations that do have a goal of undermining the U.S.
position in the region.
These findings have implications for the conduct of
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.
Based on the evidence and analyses discussed above,
drones appear to be, at most, weak substitutes for
traditional counterinsurgency operations. Punishing
insurgent organizations is only one of the strategies
outlined in the current counterinsurgency doctrine of
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps.62 The thrust of this
doctrine is protecting civilians from harm. One way to
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achieve this objective, of course, is to punish and deter
insurgent organizations. But the doctrine also emphasizes a range of steps to strengthen the population’s
identification with and loyalty to the authorities. These
include encouraging the effective provision of public
goods; engaging in information strategies that counter insurgent propaganda; coordinating the actions of
government, international, and nongovernmental actors; and ensuring that government military and civilian forces treat civilians justly and equitably. The insight here is that insurgent organizations find it much
easier to sustain themselves in environments where
state authority has broken down or is seen as illegitimate. While drones have the capability to punish and
deter insurgent organizations, they do not alone contribute to the establishment of effective state authority
in direct and meaningful ways, which likely requires
large numbers of ground forces and civilians to provide services to and gain intelligence from the local
population.63 To date, drones have been employed in
some conflicts as an alternative, rather than a complement to, counterinsurgency operations on the ground.
The United States has used drones intensively against
militants in countries where the local government
would strongly resist a more visible American military
presence (Pakistan and Yemen), or where there is not
an effective government with which to collaborate on
counterinsurgency (Somalia). The experience of Pakistan suggests that this approach is unlikely to succeed
over the longer term.
A related implication concerns collaboration with
host-nation forces and governments. Drone strikes in
Pakistan and elsewhere were initially targeted at individual leaders of militant organizations, such as al-Qaeda, that actively targeted the United States. It appears
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that the types of targets of drones have been expanded
to include both lower-level militants as well as violent
groups that target primarily the local authorities. For
example, The New York Times reports that:
[F]or at least 2 years in Pakistan, partly because of the
C.I.A.’s success in decimating Al Qaeda’s top ranks,
most strikes have been directed at militants whose
main battle is with the Pakistani authorities or who
fight with the Taliban against American troops in Afghanistan. In Yemen, some strikes apparently launched
by the United States killed militants who were preparing to attack Yemeni military forces.64

Such an expansion of targets poses risks for the
ability to effectively target members of militant organizations that aim their violence primarily against the
United States. Some host governments that receive
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency assistance
from abroad have powerful incentives to exaggerate
the threats that they and the international community
face from militants. Furthermore, actually eliminating the threat from such groups would undermine
the rationale for foreign military and civilian funding
and assistance. This could lead host governments to
calibrate their efforts against such groups carefully so
that they do not become strong enough to overthrow
the government or take control of large areas of national territory, but remain powerful enough to pose
some plausible threat.65 These incentives could lead
host governments to attempt to influence the pattern
and target of drone strikes in ways that are not consistent with U.S. interests. Host governments, for example, might provide intelligence on the location and
activities of militants that they prefer to target, while
providing less such intelligence on militants that are
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of most interest to the United States.66 An active campaign of drone strikes might also lead the host government to take less effective action against militants with
its own forces. The United States frequently suggests
that Pakistan develop and implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency program including military
force, effective police and judicial services, and economic development for areas in the western part of the
country. Such a program, even if it succeeded, would
be costly and risky for the Pakistani government and
military. Drone strikes directed against militants in
this area of the country might be seen by Pakistani
leaders as a low-cost way to pressure insurgent organizations. If this is the case, drone strikes may actually
enable host governments to avoid taking steps that the
United States considers more effective in countering
local insurgencies.
There is some reason to think that drone strikes
might achieve their objectives in a more narrowly
circumscribed counterterrorism, rather than counterinsurgency, campaign. According to Michael J. Boyle,
contemporary American doctrine views counterterrorism as a strategy that:
relies on a combined package of air power, special
forces, and the sophisticated use of intelligence to kill
enemy operatives and disrupt terrorist networks.67

Insurgency and terrorism are closely related strategies of violence, but generally exhibit at least two differences that might make drones more effective for
counterterrorism than for counterinsurgency. First,
terrorist groups typically are more extreme in their
political views—representing only a small minority of
grievances and perspectives on the use and targets of
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violence of the population on whose behalf they claim
to act—than are insurgent groups. Weaker ties to a
particular community means that drone strikes and
other forms of selective violence directed against terrorist groups are less likely to provoke a popular backlash against the United States. Second, terrorist groups
have a more limited repertoire of political tactics at
their disposal. Terrorist groups engage in violence directed against civilians, and seek to publicize their violent acts to mass audiences. Insurgent groups sometimes use and publicize the same type of violence, but
also may engage in more conventional tactics, direct
their violence at military targets, and provide services,
such as protection from predatory government forces,
to a population. This broader range of activities is more
difficult to undermine with strategies that rely solely
on selective violence, but such violence may be effective against terrorist groups with a narrower range
of action.
This claim is difficult to assess, however, since the
United States has not employed drones consistently
in a counterterrorism campaign. Instead, as discussed
above, the United States has tended to expand the targets of drone strikes from individuals who appear to
be planning attacks on the U.S. homeland, close allies,
or forces in Afghanistan, since a strict counterterrorism
approach would suggest it is appropriate to also include militants who are opposed by the government of
the state where they are active but who are not directly
planning attacks against U.S. interests. This pattern
of expansion may tell us something interesting about
the practical utility of drone strikes for counterterrorism. In both Pakistan and Yemen, the expansion has
been justified on the reasonable grounds that the new
targets are providing assistance to groups who plan
attacks that the United States wants to prevent.
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Also in both cases, the groups targeted by drones
operate in areas where the United States and the national government cannot or will not engage “on the
ground” with troops or police forces, much less with
government services such as education, in large numbers. Drones are most useful in precisely such areas,
since they allow the United States to project force
when it and the national government have few other
options. But such ungoverned spaces present two key
challenges for the effective use of drone strikes. The
absence of boots on the ground makes it more difficult
to gather human intelligence on the activities of militant groups. This means that even strikes from drones,
which have the capacity to collect real-time intelligence
on their targets, might occasionally hit the wrong targets or kill civilians. Ungoverned spaces also can allow
armed groups to proliferate and form complex and
short-lived alliances that are difficult for outsiders to
understand, increasing the challenge of targeting only
militants that oppose the United States. Drones, then,
are most useful for counterterrorism in precisely those
settings where the challenges of counterterrorism are
the greatest, and the ability to collect intelligence is the
weakest. This means that the bar for successful use of
drones to counter terrorism is set quite high, but at the
same time they are, in the words of former Director
of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta, “the only game
in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt
the al-Qaeda leadership” based in the FATA region
of Pakistan.68
Combat applications of drone technology are very
recent. But their use to date has also raised a number of
new questions about how the technology might alter
counterinsurgency in the future. At least three issues
merit sustained attention as the technology evolves.
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First, how will other countries and insurgent organizations respond to the use of drones as a U.S. tool of
counterinsurgency? Will other states seek to emulate
the United States and develop their own drone fleets
that can be used against insurgencies within their borders or overseas? Will insurgencies respond to the
proliferation of armed drones? Most drones that have
been deployed by the United States and other countries assume complete air superiority. This has allowed
many armed drones to be based on simple airframes
and to be developed with little concern about possible
countermeasures. Insurgent organizations may seek to
exploit this assumption by developing such countermeasures, or by developing their own intelligence or
armed drones. The proliferation of drone technology
to state and nonstate actors may quickly erode the U.S.
advantage in this domain, and present a range of new
and unexpected challenges.
A second issue is how the reliance on drone strikes
will influence perceptions on the part of the American
public of the acceptability and desirability of the use of
force. Drone technology reduces the costs and risks of
initiating armed conflict. The use of drones means that
U.S. military personnel are not at risk of harm, that the
occupation of foreign territory may not be necessary
in order to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign, and that backlash from civilian deaths and other
consequences of indiscriminate violence can be minimized. These lower costs make it more likely that the
American public is more willing to employ this form
of force. A large body of research has shown that the
public is more likely to oppose involvement in armed
conflicts that involve U.S. military casualties or that involve issues of peripheral interest to the core national
security goals of the country. Drones eliminate the possibility of such military casualties and, compared with
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ground forces, can be deployed relatively cheaply and
easily to even minor conflicts. It is possible, then, that
the American public will be more willing to endorse
drone strikes than they would other forms of armed
conflict. Many critics of drone strikes worry that these
lower costs will create powerful incentives for the U.S.
Government to resort to drone strikes in the face of
even minor challenges. But this is not a foregone conclusion. Other research on the support for the use of
force concludes that the American public is willing to
support such actions only when they have a reasonably high chance of succeeding in achieving their military objectives. If this focus on successful military operations is important, it may restrain decisionmakers
from resorting to drone strikes too quickly or casually.
Third, drones are an example of the discrete and
small-scale use of force to achieve particular objectives.
It is unclear how their presence in the U.S. arsenal
might influence perspectives on the forms of armed
force at the other end the spectrum. It is possible that
drones will reduce support among the American public and decisionmakers for larger-scale interventions
overseas. Individuals might be less willing to support
interventions with ground forces, for example, when
they believe that drone strikes are able to achieve the
same objectives at lower cost and risk to United States.
This perspective would be contingent on the conclusion that drone strikes are a particularly effective counterinsurgency tool. The research on drone strikes in
Pakistan reviewed above, however, does not suggest
unambiguously that this is the case. Many experts in
counterinsurgency emphasize that force is only one,
and perhaps not the most important, means of undermining an insurgency. If this preference for only lowrisk military operations were to become dominant be-
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cause of the availability of drone technology, it might
place practical limits on the ability of political leaders
and warfighters to develop plans for a more appropriate range of use of military force.
Armed drones are a remarkable development in
weapons technology. They combine multiple surveillance technologies with precision-guided munitions,
allowing the United States to project selective violence
over long distances, while placing no American personnel in harm’s way. This technology seems wellsuited to effective counterinsurgency operations that,
as a large body of scholarship and U.S. Army doctrine
suggests, are more effective when they employ force
selectively in ways that reflect solid intelligence on and
understanding of the targeted insurgent group and the
population from which it seeks to draw support. However, the evidence from the most sustained campaign
to rely on drone strikes to deter and punish insurgent
organizations in Pakistan suggests this technology has
limited capacity to achieve these objectives. Insurgencies are adaptive organizations, and may change their
behavior in response to drone strikes in ways that render the strikes ineffective or even counterproductive. It
is also very difficult to gain accurate intelligence on insurgent movements, especially when the United States
does not have personnel on the ground in sufficient
numbers to collect and place useful human intelligence
in the appropriate context, which may lead to drone
strikes that do little harm to their intended targets. Despite these limitations, drone technology seems very
likely to spread both within the United States armed
forces, the armed forces of other countries, and even to
insurgent organizations. Better understanding of the
limits of armed drones may allow their use to be more
effectively integrated with other types of armed force
and tools of foreign and security policy.
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